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Abstract
In pursuing the goals of educational reform over the past several
decades, educational policy makers have focused on teachers,
administrators, and school structures as keys to higher educational
achievement. As the would-be beneficiaries of reform, students, and
their interaction with the educational system, have been almost entirely
overlooked in the pursuit of educational excellence. Yet, as we argue,
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students are as causally central as educators in bringing about higher
educational achievement. In what follows, we examine rational student
interaction with the educational system and show why a large number of
students have incentives to undercut the intent of the reforms. These are
incentives created by our development of an educationally-based,
meritocratic social and economic system. No one, apparently, is asking
what exactly is in the reforms from the point of view of quite rational, if
sometimes irresponsible, student self-interest. Indeed, the
eduationally-based, meritocratic social and economic system may be
actually forming student preferences guaranteed to result in educational
mediocrity rather than excellence. Finally, we comment upon the
meaning of "educational excellence" and show why the educational
reformers' understanding of the purpose of public education—to compete
in the global economic system—can only fail to capture it. In doing so,
we point to the kinds of educational structures and policies that create
multiple pathways to competent adulthood that do have a chance of
bringing about the reformers' stated goal of excellence in the educational
system. But these are structures and policies that challenge the entire
conceptual framework of the current educational reform movement.
  
There is a curious omission in the spate of educational reform movement reports,
analyses, and recommendations over nearly decades of its existence. They have focused
on teachers, the curriculum, school structure and quality, content and performance
standards, teacher education, and the like. Yet almost no attention has been paid to the
would-be beneficiaries of implemented and proposed educational reforms: students. The
achievement level of American students is bemoaned and, arguably, documented in the
international comparison studies all right. But beyond being assigned the task of
benefiting from the reforms (i.e., learning), students, their roles and activities, figure
palely in the drive for higher educational achievement.
Yet, as we shall argue, it is students—their goals, motivations, and conceptions of the
good life—that may well prove to be the undoing of the educational reform movement.
In other words, we might well improve the quality of teachers, legislate higher content
and performance standards and academic requirements, and reform teacher education to
the educational reform movement's content, and still totally fail in achieving anything
close to educational excellence in our schools. The reason will be that there is nearly
total disregard for rational student interaction with the educational system. Students, in
quite rational pursuit of their own ends, are clearly capable of undermining the intent of
the reforms.
In what follows, then, we shall in Part I develop a view of what it means to be an ideal
student. Here we shall raise the question of whether students have any duty or
responsibility for acting as an ideal student would. And though we shall note that a
general view of positive student responsibility can be justifiably defended—not merely
asserted—we shall also show that students may be both irresponsible and rational in
failing to act as ideal students. In Part II, we explore the distributive behavior of the
educational system and the idea of a schooling-based meritocratic society. Here we shall
argue that this distributive behavior strongly favors the development of the kinds of
students—students in name only—who contrast strongly with a noted view of "the ideal
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student." In Part III, we shall develop a more refined typology of students as rational
actors. We argue that in full rational pursuit of their own view of the good, these
students in name only will rarely, if ever, find it in their interest to act as an "ideal
student" would. In Part IV, we shall finally establish that the failure to take into account
the various rational (and non-rational) interests of students will most likely undermine
the reformers' intent. In concluding, we point the way to the kind of fundamental and
more penetrating educational reforms that could lead the way to excellence in education
and educational achievement.
I
The Ideal Student
While the current educational reform movement has undergone successive changes in
focus since the "A Nation at Risk" report was published (D. P.Gardner, et al., National
Commission on Excellence in Education,1983), the banner of "Educational
Accountability" remains its enduring hallmark. Indeed, as Finn et al. (1985, pp. 194-195)
noted from its inception, the educational reform movement gathered steam towards its
current infatuation with state and national educational standards precisely because of the
widespread perception that the educational profession had abandoned even the pretense
of upholding educational standards, while disclaiming any responsibility for the sorry
educational results. Thus, if educators were so derelict in their duty, school boards and,
increasingly, state governors and legislatures and the federal government entered the
scene to set things aright. Through such tools as higher requirements for teacher
licensure and inservice performance and district and state, if not national, content and
performance standards, the collective feet of educators could be held to the fire for
meeting them. Student performance could then be monitored through standardized
testing, NAEP, and new (more realistic, but more expensive) statewide performance
assessments tailored to state standards. While student performance on the assessments,
of whatever sort, remains the key item of interest to the "outcomes-oriented" reformers,
educators clearly bear the onus of raising the scores. In the earlier phase of the reform
movement, more than a few school districts proposed, or flirted with, policies to
evaluate teachers individually on the assessment scores of their students. Relatively
lower scores, as proposed then, could bring teacher probation or even dismissal
(Rodman, 1986). The teacher unions and common sense, however, have generally
prevailed in arguing against such unfair evaluation practices. While school districts and
states may be devising new (and fair) ways to help suspect teachers and new incentives
to reward teaching excellence, sanctions for poor student performance are now more
often levied at entire schools, and even school districts (Darling-Hammond, 1995;
Popham, 2001).
Doubtless there are many mediocre and poor teachers in the United States and Canada
who should never be visited upon a classroom (but probably no more as a percent than
in other professions). Anyone spending time in schools will recognize this. Better
teacher preparation, better conditions of employment, better professional development,
and better procedures for identifying marginal teachers are clearly in order (especially as
promoted by educators themselves). Yet, once more the reform movement's
preoccupation with the teaching profession, as a whole, ignores a salient feature of
education: education is far more than a linear technological process in which the teacher
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transforms "raw material" (the student) into a finished "product" (an educated person).
Teaching, it is true, is a "making something happen" profession. And so there is a causal
relationship between teaching and student learning (see Ericson & Ellett, 1987). But it is
not the simple causal relationship of the manufacturing process so familiar to business
leaders, legislators, and other leaders of the educational reform movement. Though
understanding teaching as a "making something happen" profession, these leaders are
too prone to infer that a lack of success in teaching entails either that the teaching was
poor (or the teacher a failure) or else that the teacher was never trying in the first place.
Although central to the reform movement's demand forever increasing educator
accountability, the inference from lack of teaching success to poor or derelict teaching is
clearly fallacious. It simply ignores the causal role of students in bringing about their
own learning. Students, obviously, are not raw materials awaiting only a teacher's
skillful hands. They are an integral factor in the learning process. For even the best
teaching in the world will produce no results if students fail to be concerned with their
own learning and fail to master the tasks and activities necessary to educational
achievement—tasks and activities such as attending to explanations, practicing
introduced skills, and doing homework. In other words, we are speaking of an
interactive causal process in which either poor teaching or poor "studenting" is generally
sufficient for a lack of student success. (Note 1) (Of course, extraordinary teachers and
excellent students can overcome ineptitude and initial disinterest in the other party.) Not
all, therefore, hangs on the activities of the teacher as the educational reform apparently
assumes (given the broadsides against educators and silence on students). If the schools
are failing, indeed, then we have to explore the equal possibility that it is not educators,
as a whole, who are necessarily at fault; rather, might the blame be laid squarely at the
feet of our young?
Yet delicacy, rather than logic, might suggest this to be an indecent proposal. To
entertain blaming the young for our educational situation may sound a bit like
entertaining a proposal to torture the innocent. Still, it seems to be the only way to
confront the educational reform movement with the logic of its own position. For if 
educators are fair game because of their causally central role in the learning process,
then students, who are equally causally central, can hardly be spared similar attention.
Fairness simply demands it.
But much of this question concerning teacher and student accountability hinges on a
prior issue that is also overlooked. Granted that teachers and students are two major
interactive causal factors in student learning, can causation serve as a sufficient basis to
ground teacher or student responsibility? In a previous paper on teacher accountability
(Ericson & Ellett,1987), we strongly criticized the view that causation entails
responsibility. For example, atmospheric conditions may cause lightning, but we would
not hold atmospheric conditions morally, legally, or institutionally responsible for the
lightning or its effects. Thus, moral or legal responsibility does not, in general, follow
from being a causal factor.
Therefore, as with teachers, in considering whether students are to be held responsible
for their own learning, we require something beyond acknowledgement of their central
causal role. We require a moral and/or legal theory that plausibly determines student
responsibility. Here it may help to sketch an ideal of what it means to be a student. From
there we can ask whether students have an obligation to fulfill the characteristics of that
ideal. (Note 2)
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Clearly, the ideal of the student goes well beyond two well-known legal obligations
required of all students: (1) to attend a legally sanctioned place of education (including
"home schools") until a certain age and (2) to be non-disruptive. Rather, a normative
view of an ideal student extends to the manner of their activities within the school and
out. And though students engage in a variety of activities during a typical school day
ranging from the classroom, to recess, to having lunch with friends, and on to engaging
in co-curricular and extra-curricular activities. We shall construct, however, an "ideal" of
the student that focuses selectively and primarily on purely scholastic and academic
concerns.
According to this ideal, it is a major aim, internal to the practice of education, to
introduce the young child to the manifold ways that we have come to structure our
experience of the world. (Note 3) Initially, this means enabling them to begin to master
various skills common to decoding the intellectual traditions and disciplines that they
will later confront (e.g., literacy skills and computation). As they develop and build on
prior learning, they will be increasingly initiated into the whys and wherefores of the
various forms of understanding that we have achieved over time. For example, either
explicitly or implicitly, they will come to learn that the study of human history differs (in
content, concepts, methods, and tests for truth) from the study of natural science. And as
they come to see the differences and commonalities among these basic ways or
conceptual schemata by which we have structured the world, they thereby become more
competent interpreters, critics, and evaluators of them. As Paul Hirst puts it, it is what it
means to come to have a mind in the fullest sense. (Note 4)
But from this brief sketch of perhaps what many take to be the ultimate aim of
education, we can derive an intuitive view of the ideal student. It is contained in such
familiar expressions as "she is a real student of x!" Such expressions betoken a true zeal
on the part of the learner to get on the inside, to master an area or subject for its own
sake. It carries with it the idea that the learner is prepared to do whatever is necessary to
achieve that critical mastery. In part this will mean, depending upon the subject,
practicing, mastering, and engaging in exactly those activities Fenstermacher (1986)
speaks of in "studenting:": attending to instructions and explanations carefully, reading
closely, critically discussing thoroughly, investigating thoughtfully, questioning eagerly,
practicing with an eye to proficiency, appraising carefully, etc., while prizing each new
gain in understanding throughout.
It is by engaging in these activities in such adverbial fashion that we can give meaning to
such expressions as "she is a real student." They denote individuals who do not merely
fill the institutional role of student. Rather, they define for many of us the concept of the
ideal student. And, of course, it will be the best teachers who are skillful in enabling
students in the institutional sense to become students in the ideal sense.
One further aspect of this portrait of the ideal of the student remains to be emphasized.
That is the question of motivation. In speaking of a student's zeal to get on the inside of
a subject matter, we point to the fact that, whatever external utility exists in mastering it,
such external utility does not exhaust the student's interest. In other words, the student
values the learning primarily for its own sake and not merely for the sake of what it may
lead to. Students in this sense are intrinsically motivated by the subject matter. And their
preferences, commitments, and feelings come to be defined by the standards of
excellence inherent in the discipline. (Note 5)
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This ideal forms the basis for a typology and ranking of students. First, and foremost, is
the student who comes to value a domain of knowledge for its own sake. Such
individuals are purely intrinsically motivated. (They are also quite rare; we shall call
them the "scholar" type.) Next, and somewhat more frequently encountered, are students
who must often be given a specific external reason for studying a subject. These are
students who are primarily motivated for reasons extrinsic to an intellectual discipline
itself, but come to value it because it is essential to some professional (or career) goal.
(We shall call them the "professional" type.) Now there may be those who are
professionally-oriented, but who after time come to derive enjoyment from learning an
intellectual discipline itself. (We can call them the "scholar-professional" type.) Finally,
similar to, but truly unlike, the professional type of student are those who are solely
motivated for reasons strongly external to an intellectual discipline itself, because
learning the material eventually leads to what they really seek: status and wealth. For
example, they may not really care about wanting to heal people, but they view the
practice of medicine as highly lucrative.
Now all four types may engage in the activities of studenting mentioned above and may
sometimes be indiscernible to teachers. But it is mainly the scholar and
scholar-professional types that fall under our concept of the ideal student. The purely
externally motivated student, when concerned only with the status and wealth that
formal education may help bring, is unaffected by the aim of education adumbrated
above. He is a student in the institutional sense that may at times, when long-term
self-interest is considered, mimic the ideal of the student. As we shall note in the next
section, the dynamics of the educational system strongly fosters the development of this
type of student. During other times, however, the status and wealth motivated student
most closely resembles that most teacher-dreaded student type: the wholly unmotivated
student (or "indifferent/hostile" types). When coupled with indifferent or even hostile
students, the status and wealth seekers swell the ranks of those who are in the schools,
but not of it. For together they have no abiding allegiance to the purpose of education
itself. While we know of no complete survey estimating the population of each type of
student (surely an important task that should be done), general experience suggests that
alarmingly large numbers of our young fall into the educationally unmotivated category.
(Note 6) For they are students in name only. In many schools, especially at the secondary
level, educators are in a day-to-day struggle to simply find something to interest these
nominal students. As we shall explore later, status and wealth seekers and
indifferent/hostile students are quite capable of scuttling the most carefully worked out
educational reforms and may serve as the overlooked factor in undermining the reform
agenda.
But prior to attending to such issues, we finally need to comment upon the matter of
student responsibility. Granted, as we have argued, that students are causal agents of
their own learning, can students be held morally or institutionally responsible for their
own learning? Some school districts, such as Beverly Hills, California, request that all
students sign a "student responsibility contract" that purportedly obligates students to
perform the activities of students in the ideal sense. But, of course, this is a "contract"
and "obligation" in name only. It is neither enforceable in a court of law, nor in the
"court" of morality. So, this will not do.
Teachers, on the other hand, because they receive remuneration for their services and
because they assume a high moral office in a helping profession, have both a legal and
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moral responsibility to do all that is in their power and authority to ensure that students
learn and are introduced to the activities of the ideal student. The educational reformers,
like the educational profession itself, do have a legitimate interest in calling to task those
in the profession who fall short in upholding that moral office. Parents and guardians,
similarly, share in a legal and moral obligation to foster and encourage the development
of their young to the utmost. And when parents themselves fall short, educators are
correct in pointing out that parental negligence can be a major source of our educational
ills. Though accurate enough, parents cannot be regulated by the state in the way that
teachers can be. They fulfill the letter of the law by trying to ensure the regular school
attendance of their children. Hence, educators tend to be the sole target of the reformers
as a matter of politics and policy.
But what of student responsibility for learning? As we have argued elsewhere, students
can be held morally responsible in the context of a liberal democratic society. (Note 7)
In so far as the chief purpose of education is held to be induction into the ideals of
democratic citizenship, students have an interlocking right to education that comes with
a duty to take it seriously (especially as students develop in rationality). (Note 8) Some
rights also incur obligations, and civic education in a pluralistic democratic society (but
not all societies) is one of these. 
But to the extent that educational reformers emphasize other ends as the chief purposes
of education, such as national economic expansion and personal social and economic
status, the message is muddied, if not vitiated. (Note 9) We might well think that
personal self-interest would dictate attending to the activities of the ideal student. An
interest, however, does not a moral obligation make. As policy makers, the educational
reformers are on a slippery slope of their own devising. Self-interest, even rational
prudence, may channel students in a completely different direction than that envisioned
by them. We shall argue this in a variety of ways in the next section. Excellence in
education and the Jeffersonian ideal of a democratic public cannot be purchased, no
matter what the amount, by mercantilistic ends.
II
Meritocracy, The Educational System, and the 
Educational Reform Movement
If a person comes to form certain goals, then one comes to have a certain interest in the
means to reaching them. The point is conceptual. If it is a young person's considered
desire to truly explore a school subject, to get the most out of it, then it is in her interest
to master the art and skills of studenting. To the student in the ideal sense, performing
the acts of studenting and performing them well is always in her self-interest. And it
might be thought that it is a major function of the educational system to encourage this
interest in studenting and to see that it is spread to as many students as possible. There is
no doubt that many educators at the classroom and school levels are striving to do
exactly that. Bringing students along to become intrinsically motivated in a subject
matter is widely held to be one of the highest aims of teaching and education.
At the level of the education system as a whole, however, the story is rather different.
Here, what is encouraged is not so much the attitudes and activities of studenting in the
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ideal sense as studenting in what we call the "systemic" sense. Here the goals of
studenting in the ideal sense—the zestful pursuit of knowledge and understanding—give
way to the goals of studenting in the systemic sense: the pursuit of grades, degrees, and
careers. In the systemic sense of studenting, knowledge and understanding, at best, are
merely means to these other goals. At worst, the true pursuit of knowledge and
understanding is an impediment to their attainment.
We shall now explore why the educational system at the aggregate level encourages
studenting in the systemic sense, explore what those activities and attitudes are, and
show how they work to discourage students from becoming students in the ideal sense.
In Part III, we shall also comment on the rationality of the totally indifferent and even
hostile student.
The Distributive Behavior of the Educational System (Note 10)
It is difficult to understand the emergence, development, and expansion of the American
educational system without taking into account deeply-rooted, American cultural beliefs
concerning the value of education. Jefferson long ago noted that a liberal education is
essential to the preservation of the republic. The pioneers, who immediately established
schools upon settling, saw in education the extension of civilization and the preservation
of cultural tradition. And as the nation became transformed from an agrarian to an
incipient and now full-blown technological society, the American school was viewed as
more and more central to the creation of a skilled workforce. It is this latter view
concerning the value and importance of education, of course, that primarily motivates
the educational reform movement, concerned as it with America's position in the world
economy.
But there were other social forces at work that help explain the now nearly universal
attendance and attainment of pre-collegiate education and rapidly expanding
post-secondary education. Chief among these forces is that long-entrenched, almost
fervent, American belief in the social and economic efficacy of education. It is a belief,
or related collection of beliefs, that far predates the transformation of the early American
agrarian economy. Writing in the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, 1969)
clearly recognized this boundless faith in the power of education:
Even the crowd can now plainly see the utility of knowledge, those who
have no taste for its charms set store by its results and make some effort to
acquire it…
As soon as the crowd begins to take an interest in the labors of the mind, it
finds out that to excel in some of them is a powerful aid to the acquisition of
fame, power, or wealth (p. 458).
The belief in the social and economic efficacy of education springs from 18th century
liberal ideology that holds that social rewards and privileges belong not to an elite,
hereditary class, but should go to those individuals of talent, intelligence, and industry.
The ideology of America, if not the reality, has always been one of meritocracy. Thus,
with the growth of the common school in the 19th century, it takes little imagination to
understand how beliefs concerning the social and economic efficacy of education could
be translated into a conviction that schooling pays social and economic dividends.
Clearly, it is a conviction that could appeal to employers interested in the relatively
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greater profits an educated workforce could generate. And it could appeal to individuals
who viewed schooling as a way to better their life chances. The transformation of the
secondary school from an elite to a mass institution in the 20th century appears to have
cemented the relationship between the social and economic efficacy of education and the
conviction that schooling pays off socially and economically. (Note 11) In the later rapid
expansion of higher education, we find ample confirmation of that expected relationship.
To understand why, imagine a society that distributes social and economic benefits
(income, status, earnings opportunities, etc.) on the basis of the distribution of purely
educational benefits (knowledge, skills, judgment, etc.). Such a society is likely to be
extremely inefficient. It is difficult and time-consuming to discover who knows more
and who less. But if there were an intervening social institution that functions to
evaluate individuals' relative possession of educational benefits, then such official
testimony would straightforwardly provide the basis for a subsequent distribution of
social and economic benefits.
In our own society, it is through the development of certification in the educational
system (by such instruments as grades, test scores, diplomas, and transcripts) that made
possible the development of a relatively efficient meritocracy based on education and
gave powerful confirmation to the belief in the efficacy of education. Further, it welded
a hodgepodge of schools and colleges into a national educational system. For just as
certification serves the social and economic system, grades, transcripts, etc. serve the
educational system as a "medium of exchange." This medium of exchange function of
grades, transcripts, and diplomas is based on their rough "surrogate" (Note 12) capability 
to stand in for or represent the possession of relative levels of knowledge, skills, and
judgment. The standard grade of "A," for example, is shorthand, a way of saying that a
student has shown superior mastery of a subject (given a certain system level). It permits
the avoidance of exhausting discussions of exactly what the student has mastered. And
in their medium of exchange function, these surrogate educational benefits make
possible communication among educational institutions creating easier transfer and
placement policies between schools at the same level and ease and efficiency in
selection and placement policies between schools at different levels (say, high school
and college). Thus, surrogate educational benefits make the educational system possible.
Yet they also provide the basis for linking the educational system as a whole with the
social and economic system.
It is not difficult, then, to understand how an actual educationally-based, meritocratic
society works. Basically, it encompasses four distinct distributions of which only two are
the educational system's own. They can be encapsulated as follows:
Figure 1
  
Figure 1 can be understood as saying that the distribution of educationally relevant
attributes (intelligence, tenacity, and choice) in the school-age population in large part
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gives rise to the distribution of educational benefits in that same population (some learn
more than others). In turn, the distribution of educational benefits produce a distribution
of surrogate educational benefits (some are evaluated more highly or get higher test
scores than others). Finally, the distribution of social and economic benefits (some get
better jobs, earn more, obtain higher status than others) is distributed on the basis of the
relative distribution of surrogate educational benefits.
Of these four distributions, only 2 and 3 are clearly distributed by the educational system
directly. (The "genetic lottery" and early childhood life chances generate the distribution
of educationally relevant attributes; the social and economic system directly distributes
social and economic benefits.) But what is central to the idea an educationally-based
meritocratic society is the notion that adult social and economic advantages should be
based on the distribution of (surrogate) educational benefits. "On the basis," then, entails
that there is more than an empirical likelihood of a positive relation between the two
distributions. Rather, it has to do with the manner in which the adult distribution of
social and economic benefits is socially legitimated. (Note 13) As Green et al. (1980,
1997, Ch. 6) put it, entailed is the following normative principle: "Those having a
greater share of (surrogate) educational benefits merit or deserve a greater share of social
and economic benefits." This educationally-based meritocratic principle provides a
social basis for the way that subsequent social and economic inequalities can be
regarded as justified. (Note 14) It is a principle, in other words, of distributive justice. It
is the principle concealed in the very notion that schooling pays. It is also the principle
responsible for prompting students to student in the systemic, rather than ideal, sense
that we shall explore below. Moreover, it is the principle that may well prevent any real
and lasting educational reform. It remains now for us to draw out how differing student
types might rationally interact with a meritocratic educational and social system.
III
The Different Ways of 
Rationally Interacting with the System
Up to this point in our treatment of the student and educational reform, we have not
adequately considered the importance of a student's entire motivational and belief
configuration. Although it is helpful to know that a person has a certain view of the
good, more information is needed to explain, and in most cases justify, the student's
interaction with the educational system. Beyond coming to know a person's view of the
good and their other, perhaps conflicting, goals and purposes, we also require an
understanding of the relative strength of each of these if we are to understand what the
person has good reason to do. In adopting this explanatory framework of student
behavior, we are in effect considering students as rational agents who pursue alternative
courses of action for which there are comparatively good reasons. Since young children
generally have not developed a motivational and belief system sufficiently to be viewed
as rational agents, we shall confine our analysis to the population of intermediate, senior
high, and college students who are (roughly) rational agents. (We readily grant that many
students at these levels are not -- or only occasionally -- rational believers and doers;
their beliefs and behaviors often demonstrate that.) Here, we want to show that even 
when students are fully rational, the distributive dynamics of the educational system
encourages student conduct that conflicts with the ideal of the student—and so creates
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conflicts between educational objectives and student objectives. These conflicting aims
and desires present extraordinary challenges to and put constraints on the direction and
degree of real educational reform.
In assuming that the educational system contains some students who are rational, the
power of our analysis depends crucially on the conception of "rationality" that we use. It
is difficult to find answers to questions about whether an action is rational (reasonable),
and in many areas such answers are controversial as well. (For example, it is extremely
controversial whether every rational actor has compelling reasons to treat all people
morally.) Regardless of the difficulty in all cases, our arguments will assume three major
claims about rational agency that are well-established and accepted by most current
philosophical research (and even here there is controversy—followers of David Hume
would not fully endorse our second claim):
C1. A rational agent need not (but can) have a dominant concern for his or her
own long term welfare.
C2. A rational agent's desires and beliefs are open to critical appraisal in light of
the facts and logic.
C3. In so far as a rational agent seeks a specific goal, the agent will seek out
effective means for fulfilling that goal.
The first claim rejects the view that a rational person is necessarily prudent (e.g., see
Parfit, 1986, on critical present aim views of rationality). The second claim rejects the
view that only the means to fulfilling one's desires—and not the desires themselves—are
open to critical appraisal. In what follows, we assume, therefore, that the rational agent's
beliefs and motivations could be appraised as reasonable or unreasonable in light of his
or her circumstances. The third claim reminds us that all rational agents will take care to
find ways to reach their goals. It is, however, beyond the scope and limits of this paper
to provide the detailed arguments to sustain these claims.
What reasons, then, might a student who has various capacities, beliefs, purposes,
loyalties, and commitments have for interacting in certain ways with teachers,
administrators, counselors, etc. in the system? Let us begin by reconsidering the ideal
student who intrinsically values knowledge and understanding (i.e., for its own sake) and
who is intrinsically motivated in the educational system. When this type of student
interacts with the system, the love of scholastic and academic learning dominates and
primarily influences the person's behavior. Of course, if basic economic needs are not
being met apart from activities in the educational system, rationality requires that such a
student temper her pursuit of the intrinsic benefits of learning with more career-related
aims. (It may well be irrational for a person to go through primary and secondary school
loving learning but never pondering how they are going to live after the close of their
school years.) But still the ideal student is only motivated in minor ways by the extrinsic
values of education. As noted above, we call this kind of student "the scholar." And as
mentioned previously, this ideal student is rare, indeed.
Consider now the type of student who is primarily attracted to a particular practice or
profession (say, healing people or designing high quality items in the cases of medicine
or engineering, respectively), but who sees no (or little) intrinsic value in knowledge or
understanding per se. This individual will require that all the knowledge and
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understanding worth acquiring must be relevant to his or her professional goals. In
dealing with teachers and texts, this kind of student, who we have called "the
professional," will be motivated to learn, but only on the condition that the teaching (and
the grades) is clearly connected to becoming a certain kind of professional.
It has often been said that the best motivation for learning something is intrinsic
motivation (see, e.g., Jerome Bruner, 1960). In the strong sense, however, this is false. In
caring strongly about achieving some good internal to a practice (say, healing people),
then a rational agent would care strongly about acquiring the means to achieve the goal.
This is roughly the principle (C3) of practical rationality. One of the best motivations for
learning organic chemistry is the belief that it will be really useful in the medical
profession. The professionally-oriented student need not intrinsically value organic
chemistry, but her respect for its utility will lead her to learn it very well indeed.
It should now be clear that differences between the scholar and the professional account
for much of the differences in what is learned and how it is learned. Because their
primary reasons differ, these two types demand and expect different things from teachers
and the system. For example, the professional type will always be ready to demand from
teachers how the content will be useful for her career interests. ("How will I ever use this
stuff?!?")
And these differences between types of students can take place within a single individual
who strongly, intrinsically values the various forms of knowledge but who, to an equal
degree, extrinsically values these forms. For such an agent, determining what to learn
and how thoroughly to learn it will be a difficult trade-off (or compromise) between
competing goods. Knowing what to expect of this bifurcated agent is a difficult task.
This type of person may demand and expect different things at different times in ways
that seem to lead to unpredictable and irregular behavior. We have called this kind of
student the "scholar-professional."
For each of the three types of students, who most closely fit aspects of the ideal student,
we have assumed that their motivation for economic and social status has little influence
on their interaction with the educational system. We assume that their primary and
dominant motives to be either the intrinsic and/or extrinsic valuing of educational
benefits. Recall, however, that the surrogate educational benefits (grades, test scores,
diplomas, etc.) function to distribute non-educational social and economic benefits. Now
it is clearly possible and probable in our individualistic, wealth- and status-oriented
society (though clearly not necessary) for a rational agent to be primarily motivated to
acquire the various social and economic goods that help make life more enjoyable (to an
extent). As Toqueville noted, it is also possible and probable that a rational agent may
come to see that acquiring a differentially greater share of surrogate educational benefits
is a comparatively reasonable means to acquiring a differentially greater share of social
and economic benefits. (It is a highly risky, if not downright irrational, strategy to count
on just being lucky.)
Suppose, now, that this kind of rational agent neither extrinsically nor intrinsically
values pure educational benefits (knowledge, skills, understanding, etc.). This student,
who we have called "the status and wealth seeker" (one kind of "systemic" student),
wants the degree (or the grade) only because it is a reasonable means to social and
economic benefits. But this kind of student will regard the acquisition of knowledge and
understanding as an arbitrary hurdle or obstacle to getting the diploma (and then the
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goods). Though the status and wealth seeker will want the grade and eventually the
diploma, he or she will regard the learning as utter drudgery—something to be done as
minimally as possible and something to be forgotten as soon as it is practical (i.e., as
soon as the grade is assigned, the degree received, or the SAT test taken (Note 15)). This 
type of "student" will be like a chameleon to his or her teachers. For this type's public
display will be like the scholar but with a fair emphasis on "brown nosing" behavior.
Privately, however, he or she finds it all a rather disgusting game to have to play, though
one played with typical thespian resources. When it is possible to avoid detection, the
status and wealth seeker will lie and cheat, plagiarize, steal, or buy the necessary work
(term paper mills), and do anything that will prevent other students from receiving
higher grades than his or her own.
Though morally rather unattractive, we should expect little else from a rational agent
who sees the institutional norms of schooling and the social tradition of academic
education as basically arbitrary matters. As we shall see, the normative principle
connecting the educational and social and economic systems strongly encourage status
and wealth seekers to remain in the educational system when their talents and capacities
might be more productively—not to say morally—engaged in pursuits outside it. But the
development of this kind of person is an unintended effect of our adoption of an
educationally-based meritocracy.
There is yet a final kind of systemic student to identify: to save space (since they are
somewhat different, but motivationally the same in school), we called this type "the
indifferent/hostile student." This is the "student" who neither intrinsically or extrinsically
values pure educational benefits nor expects (or wants) a relatively greater share of
social and economic benefits brought about through the pursuit of higher grades or
diplomas. These individuals may very well want an abundance of material wealth and
social respect; but they either disdain the effort (and charade) the status and wealth
seeker employs in securing surrogate educational benefits or else views the institution of
schooling with repugnance.
How, then, could it be rational for the indifferent/hostile student to remain within the
educational system and not drop out? The answer easily could be friends and
expectations. The indifferent/hostile student's friends are in school and he or she has a
primary motivation to be with them. Alternatively, such persons know that the family
and society at large expect them to be in school, and they strongly want to please them.
Finally, it is extremely rational for a teenage drug dealer to want to be close to the
market of other kids. All of these are plausible and, no doubt, salient reasons for many of
our disaffected young. 
But a deeper reason for staying in school has to do with the dynamics of the educational
system that dictate a defensive strategy for rational agents continuing in school at least
through the 12th grade. As rates of high school completion have climbed towards 100%
of the school-age population in this past century (currently about 80% of 17 year- olds
complete high school), the positive social and economic benefits associated with high
school completion have drastically declined. Indeed, as a purely logical point, at 100
percent attainment, completion of high school in itself can have no disproportionate
social and economic pay-off for individuals (Green et al. 1980 & 1997, Ch. 6). (This
means that the status and wealth-seeking student is forced to go on to higher education
where the pay-off prospects are still real.) But if completion of high school is no longer a 
big deal, not completing high school is an absolute disaster for individuals. In an
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educational system in which nearly everyone completes high school, being one of the
few who drop out is a near certain recipe for a life of the lowest paying jobs with an
attendant probability of periods of unemployment or a generally unappealing life. (How
many "life-long" drug dealers manage to retire after leading a "work" life free of
misfortune?) The indifferent/hostile student, if rational, is compelled to remain in school
out of defensive necessity (see also Thurow, 1975).
But since the indifferent/hostile student is indifferent or hostile to both the acquisition of
knowledge and understanding and to the relatively greater social and economic pay-off
of advanced formal education, this systemic type of student will have little reason to
come truly to grips with the curriculum or even to engage in the status and
wealth-seeker's charade with teachers. They have reason only to avoid the disaster that
confronts the school dropout. And once they are compelled to be in school where they, at
bottom, do not want to be, their expression of frustration, boredom, and hostility is quite
understandable, if not potentially explosive (witness the rash of school shootings, etc.)
The five general kinds of students can, thusly, be categorized in terms of the kind of
motive and the (comparative) strength of the motive (see Table 1 below). What it shows
is that rational students can have a variety of different kinds of reasons for dealing with
the educational system. For each type of student, the reasons they have will provide the
rational justification for their action strategies. (And here we must stress the equally
important fact that many students interact irrationally or non-rationally with the
educational system, but still they mimic in large part the behavior of the status and
wealth-seeker and the indifferent/hostile students: the two kinds of systemic students.
They just are not as consistent and clear-minded about why they act as they do.)
Moreover, a typology of the kind that we offer here calls for more and better empirical
research to determine more precisely the relative proportions of each kind of rational
student at the various levels of the educational system and their less rational
counterparts. (Note 16) Such research will improve our understanding of what kinds of
reforms are likely to be effective in working with each kind of student and in what
degree. As we turn to the final part of this paper, we shall address our comments to other
important, more philosophical, aspects of this issue.
Table 1
Certain Types of Student With Respect to Kind and Strength of
Motive
 Kind of Motives (Reasons)
 Intrinsically 
Motivated by 
Knowledge and
Understanding
Extrinsically 
Motivated by the 
Utility of Knowledge
Extrinsically 
Motivated by 
the Social and
Economic 
Benefits of 
Educational 
Attainment
Scholar Dominant-Strongest Weak Weak
Professional Weak Dominant-Strongest Weak
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Scholar-Professional One of the Two
Dominant/Strong
The Other of the Two
Dominant/Strong
Weak
Status and Wealth
Seeker Strongest
Weak Weak Dominant/
Strong
Indifferent/
Hostile 
Weak Weak Weak or
Negative 
Dominant 
Strongest
  
IV
Student Rationality, Educational Excellence, and
The Educational Reform Movement
Through the framework we have established, we hope we have made a start in
establishing that rational student action can have a powerful effect on the eventual
results of the educational reform movement. Yet it still seems rather odd that there is
very little mention in the educational reform literature on potential student reaction to
reform efforts. And what little there is comes mainly from within the educational
profession itself (for example, the so-called "middle-school philosophy"). But perhaps
this oversight should not be overly surprising after all. For several concerns and
assumptions have been at work in the educational reform literature from its inception
with "The Nation at Risk" report. These are concerns and assumptions that have
dominated and directed the ensuing discussion and debate by policy makers over what
reforms to pursue.
The first of these concerns has been the economic competitiveness of the various states,
and the nation as a whole, as the post-World War II dominance of the United States
underwent successive challenges on the world market, especially in the 1970—1990
period. It was during this time that the educational reform movement first emerged and
gathered steam to the point that the 2000 state and national elections made educational
achievement the paramount political issue facing the country. (Now, of course,
education has been overshadowed by the events of 11 September 2001.) In other words,
the policy makers have shackled the cause of educational reform to the fortunes of our
aggregate economic activity. But this view of the purpose of education—to supply a
schooled workforce to meet the needs of an increasing technological world—almost
guarantees that the young and their purposes for undertaking schooling will be lost from
view. Yet almost no one, we would conjecture, goes to school and strives (or fails to
strive) for higher levels of educational achievement because it is good for the American 
economy. Because of this tunnel vision driving educational reform, it is difficult to find
a policy maker on whatever level who has asked a most basic question: What is in it for
the student?
Second, in viewing high levels of educational achievement as the principal means to
attain economic salvation, the educational reform movement tends to assume that the
young are monolithic in nature. Indeed, the ongoing concern with school drop outs has
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one primary aim: get them back in school (or keep them from dropping out) so that they
can be "regular" students once more. But, as we have argued, there is no such thing as a
"regular" student. There are a variety of student types who vary in their goals and
strength of motivation, and by anyone's estimate most of these do not resemble the three
types of an ideal students. Enticing drop outs back into schools will do little more than
reinforce this monolithic view of students and perhaps lower achievement levels further.
Early school leavers, many of whom have subjectively reasonable beliefs in light of their
limited experience, can potentially be shown that it is definitely in their long-term social
and economic self-interest to return to (or stay in) school, if only to avoid the disaster
that is their eventual destination. But such policies and programs to encourage them to
return to school will only swell the ranks of indifferent/hostile students (and to some
extent status and wealth-seekers), which is why most of them left school to begin with. It
is not that we should be indifferent to the plight of the drop out, for it is serious and real.
Rather, we need to understand that keeping those young in school who have no taste, at
least at the moment, for academic work is hardly a recipe for higher levels of
achievement in the aggregate and for harmonious school environments.
Again, for any proposed educational reform, we must ask one of the most important
policy questions: What is in it for the student? And this is not simply a crass, egoistic
type of question to raise either. Some ends for which humans act are ultimate ends
concerning "internal" goods (about which more below) and can be shown to be worthy
of both rational and moral choice. Thus, the scholar, the professional, and the
scholar/professional type of student who, in pursuing the ideals of knowledge and
understanding and/or service to fellow citizens and humanity, are engaged in pursuits
and practices that are rationally and morally laudatory. But still, it makes sense to ask
from their point of view what is in any proposed educational reform for them? Yet these
kinds of students are probably in the minority of students in the educational system. The
educational system, because of the normative principle linking the educational and
social and economic systems, is replete with systemic status and wealth seekers and
indifferent/hostile students. (And it is well to notice that many so-called
professionally-oriented students are actually status and wealth seekers. How many
students, for example, would pursue the medical or legal professions were they of low
pay and low prestige?) Thus, the success of implemented and proposed educational
reforms rests largely on their ability to engage the interest of the status and wealth seeker
and the indifferent/hostile student.
But now consider the nature of the proposed and implemented reforms. For example,
there are reforms that lengthen the school day and the school year. There are reforms that
call for a more demanding school curriculum and higher graduation requirements. There
are reforms that call for the ending of the "social promotion" of students from one grade
to the next higher, regardless of school performance. There are educational reforms that
mandate a minimum grade point average for participation in extracurricular activities
such as sports. And there are state standards-based exams that govern high school
graduation. Now few of these reforms are likely to affect adversely the interests of the
scholar, the scholar/professional, and the professional. Of course,the professional and
scholar/professional may resent more and higher requirements in areas irrelevant to their
interests. However, one of these reforms—standards-based examinations—could well
impact adversely the interests of the scholar and the scholar/professional. That would
especially be true if the testing, as likely, drives classroom instruction in a teacher and
school "accountability-based system" now being implemented in state after state. For as
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teachers and administrators feel accountability pressures to raise average test scores, they
are likely to target instruction at the "least able" students (who have the most room to
improve). We should expect an attendant result to be the lowering of the level and
content of teaching. In this way, state standards-based, assessment and accountability
systems could help turn many ideal students into cynical, resentful ones or else help
drive them into the private sector of the educational system. Alternatively, even the
scholar may become frustrated by a different kind of reform found in the Ontario,
Canada schools that expects students to master a far more demanding curriculum in
much less time—a form of "curricular intensification."
But, now, what is in these reforms for the status and wealth seeker and the
indifferent/hostile student? The answer is little else but pain and suffering. The most
rational response of the status and wealth seeker is to seek shortcuts and end-runs around
these reforms when necessary and to try to frustrate their intent whenever possible. For
the indifferent/hostile student, there is but one rational strategy: sabotage at all times by
refusing to play the game when there is nothing at stake personally. And when high
school completion is at stake in those school districts and states with test-passing
requirements, the indifferent/hostile student, if rational, will put forward the minimal
effort necessary in order to pass the test, thus only grudgingly avoiding the plight of the
drop out.
Of course, these are but a few ways to frustrate and undermine attempts to reform the
educational system. Many of our more rational students, in the main, may not know and
understand in any great depth the various ways we have come to structure our experience
of the world, but they can be very clever and resourceful in ensuring that they never
come to that truly educated state. And can we blame them? Perhaps in a world that
emphasizes the intrinsic value of pure educational benefits and their service in upholding
the ideals of democratic citizenship, we might well place blame on the more rational
students who foolishly waste important educational opportunities. But can we place
blame on such students in a world that emphasizes formal schooling as the prime means
to economic dominance as a nation and "making it" socially and economically in
personal terms? (Can we even place blame on such students in a world that uses grades
"earned" to sort students at each level? Even the scholar and professional types will see
how getting high grades is strongly related to getting into higher levels of the system.)
(Note 17) We think not. For it is not our students who have placed great emphasis on the
purely instrumental value of formal education for both the economy and the social and
economic standing of the individual. Rather, it is the truncated vision of the erstwhile
educational reformers and of a society that apparently cares more about the credentialed
symbols of educational achievement than about the intrinsic and extrinsic value of pure
educational benefits in leading a good and worthy life. We have, in other words,
unerringly established an educational system and a set of social and economic incentives
that are guaranteed to deliver marginal educational achievement and to create resistance
to any real and meaningful educational reform. We should not be surprised, therefore, to
find so many status and wealth seekers and indifferent/hostile students in our schools.
For in creating an educationally-based meritocracy, we have done everything we could
to encourage their development.
Education in this way, rather than seriously pursued, becomes a rather cynical game to
be played. The problem is not that we fail to value education. Clearly, Americans (and
Canadians) do. The problem, instead, is the way we value education.
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This points to the deep and final incoherence that lies at the heart of the educational
reform movement. By shackling the drive for educational excellence in education to the
cause of competitiveness in the world market, we are likely to achieve neither. For at the
heart of the reform movement, there exists a defective understanding of the nature of
educational goods, true educational standards, and how excellence is to be promoted and
sustained. The cause of this defective understanding is an intellectually-derived, moral
tradition that runs deep and powerful in American life: "moral individualism." Moral
individualism is, as Stoutland notes, "...a comprehensive, individualistic moral theory
about how individuals should live their lives and relate to society" (1990, p. 107). At its
best, it can provide a rationale and basis for understanding society as a cooperative
endeavor in which some self-sacrifice is required of all for the benefit of all. At its
worst, and this is its modal tendency, moral individualism promotes egoism and the
satisfaction of individual preferences even at the expense of others. Since, as we claim,
moral individualism is clearly reflected in the thinking of the educational reformers, it
will profit us to examine some of the beliefs that comprise it.
Moral Individualism and the Educational Reform Movement
Again following Stoutland, "...moral individualism understands the good as anything
that satisfies an individual's desires, interests, or preferences. This implies that all goods
must be individual goods, that is, goods for, and assignable to, particular individuals,
since all desires, interests, or preferences belong to particular individuals" (1990, p.
119). It follows from this that a social good can only be one that satisfies the preferences
of most of society's members because a social or public good is only the sum of
individual preferences. The common good or public interest is only, on this view, the
sum of individual preferences. The common good or public interest is thus necessarily
reducible to the private interests of individuals. The provision of education to all, then, is
a social or public good if it can be shown to be in the public interest, that is, the interests
of most of society's members. Although altruism—or the self-sacrifice of one's own
private interests for the private interests of others—can find a place within moral
individualism, that place is necessarily precarious. For happiness or the good life in
moral individualism is a life in which one's own private interests are maximally
satisfied. Thus, appeals to the common good must be couched in terms of appeals to the
private interests of the many. And when individuals do not see a particular candidate for
a public good deserving of their own support (i.e., in their own private interest), the
majority who do may be forced to compel self-sacrifice on the part of those who do not
(e.g., compel them to pay taxes for the support of formal education). As, Stoutland
succinctly puts it, "What is distinctive about moral individualism is not that it assigns no
important role to society, but that it regards society, as wholly instrumental to goods for
the particular individuals who are its members…Societies [on this view] do not
constitute preferences; their role is to satisfy them" (1990, pp. 120).
We are now in a position to appreciate the way in which the educational reform
movement is ensnared in the trap of moral individualism. In order to appeal for higher
levels of achievement in—and more money and accountability for—education, the
reformers have been forced to explain how higher achievement is instrumental to the
satisfaction of the sum total of private interests. This they have done through the appeal
to the economic competitiveness of the nation and the related theme of a forewarned
unilateral " educational disarmament." (Note 18)>
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But while the reformers carried on the battle-cry for educational reform to society at
large, they left their rear unguarded on the issue that we have addressed: the interests of
students. But should they finally address the various rational interests of students, then
what, within the confines of the value framework of moral individualism, can they say?
First of all, no appeal is possible to education as an intrinsically valuable good, since in
moral individualism nothing has intrinsic worth. Here something is good only if it
satisfies some private preference. Second, for them no appeal is possible to education as
an extrinsically valuable good, a good which by definition leads to an intrinsically
valuable good, since again in moral individualism nothing has intrinsic worth. For such
a view, something is good only if it satisfies private (short term or long term)
preferences. And if a student has no preference for higher educational achievement
(short term or long term), no instrumental appeal is possible. Third, because the
reformers have tied education to the purpose of economic competitiveness—rather than
to the non-individualistic ideals of full-blown rationality and democratic citizenship—no
appeal to student responsibility is possible. And fourth, appeals to students to achieve
highly for the public good (economic competitiveness) are definitely likely to fall on
deaf ears. Any tendencies toward self-sacrifice in our moral individualistic society are
fairly diminished by the teenage years. (The patterns of altruism that clearly do remain
are no doubt testaments to the staying power of those more communitarian social
institutions such as the family and church.) And finally, unlike the paying of taxes, it is
doubtful that we would compel the young to self-sacrifice by threatening fines and
prison sentences for low achievement—though in a few places state legislators have
actually introduced bills to deny a driver's license to errant students!
Thus, the only appeal to students that can work is to their self-interest. The educational
reform movement has no other real recourse. But in the appeal to narrow self-interest we
have, given the structure and dynamics of an educationally-based meritocracy supported
(by and large) by a bedrock of moral individualism, the very instrument that delivers the
educational mediocrity the reformers decry. What the reformers fail to see is that the
structure and dynamics of the educational system are actively forming and encouraging
student preferences that run counter to the creation and sustenance of educational
excellence. One might say that the system is creating status and wealth seekers and
indifferent/hostile students. Excellence in education has nothing at all to do with the
external goals of sustaining a competitive economy or materially enriching individuals.
But that is something very difficult for those of us caught up in our individualistic
culture to understand. And it is certainly the central defect of the educational reform
movement. It leads to the incoherence of which we spoke. Indeed, excellence in
education is not something that can fit into the framework of moral individualism at all.
Educational Excellence and the Idea of a Public Good
Central to this understanding is the act of recognizing that there are some kinds of goods
that are irreducibly public goods—goods that cannot be privately assigned to or
appropriated by individuals alone. Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (1981) establishes 
this in his account of social practices and his distinction between "internal" and
"external" goods. For MacIntyre, a practice is "...any coherent and complex form of
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partly definitive of, that form of activity" (1981,
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p. 175). Examples are complex games, true professions, and, not least, the various arts
and sciences. What is common to all of these is the fact that they each contain standards
of excellence (norms) that define their corresponding activities and what it means to be a
skillful participant in them. Moreover, they each require no mean effort to master (and
typically require forms of apprenticeship); and in many cases they cannot fully be
appreciated (or judged) except by those on the inside of the practice. On the other hand,
goods are external to a practice if they can be secured in some other fashion than through
the practice itself. Status and wealth are obvious examples. Since external goods can be
appropriated by and assigned to individuals, they are "...characteristically objects of
competition in which there must be losers as well as winners" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 178).
And although internal goods are "...the outcome of competition to excel…it is
characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who
participate in the practice" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 178). In other words, they are not
reducible to the good of particular individuals.
The achievement of knowledge is one such example of an irreducible public good that
benefits the community. And note that in the transmission of knowledge through
education, teachers do not give up something when students come to understand. The
economics of exchange relations do not apply here (nor, as Green et al., 1980 and 1997,
note, is knowledge subject to the economist's notion of "decreasing marginal utility").
Now MacIntyre's account of practices allows us to establish exactly why the educational
reform movement has a flawed and defective vision of educational excellence. In
understanding the practice of education as merely instrumental to satisfying certain
desires (i.e., economic competitiveness or individual social and economic well-being),
they reduce educational benefits to external goods. But excellence in education can only
be understood by reference to the public standards internal to the practice. (Note 19) In
this way, pure educational benefits are not goods because they satisfy individual
preferences. They are goods because they are specified by the standards of excellence
internal to the various forms of knowledge that we have achieved over time. They can be
realized only by engaging (to a considerable degree) in the practice of education in its
own terms, by coming to see its point in and of itself, and therefore only by submitting
oneself to its discipline. (Note 20)
But in thinking of educational benefits as merely the means to satisfy aggregate or
individual preferences, the educational reform movement rules out the possibility of
understanding education in its own light. In so doing, the policy makers necessarily fail
to capture the very nature of educational excellence from the outset.
The Practice of Education and Educational Reform
In taking the practice of education in its own light seriously, we quickly begin to
reconsider the meaning of questions such as "What is in it for the student?" That
question, we should note, arose primarily within the framework of moral individualism.
Instead, we need to think about educational reform in terms of the institutions whose
role it is to sustain the virtues inherent in the practice of education. Again, if we look at
the educational system today, we witness an institution that undermines, rather than
sustains, the pursuit of educational excellence. Individualist thinking simply lacks the
capacity to understand how important the structures of society are in forming individual
preferences in the first place. The normative principle that governs the link between the
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educational system and the social and economic system simply instantiates the norm that
the road to riches is through high grades, rather than emphasizing the intrinsic and
extrinsic value of educational benefits. Instead of taking the interests of the status and
wealth seeker and the indifferent/hostile student as givens and then asking how we can
transform their preferences into those of ideal students, we should be asking a far
different question (unless we want to continue to blame educators in the interest of
political mileage). For the fact remains that once formed, preferences are difficult to
change. Rather, we should be asking: "What is it about the educational system that leads
to the development of status and wealth seekers and indifferent/hostile students?" In
other words, transforming the educational system may be the only way to transform
individuals. Only then does the direction of real and meaningful educational
reform—and the true meaning of educational excellence—become evident.
This is the direction that has been urged by Green et al. (1980 & 1997, pp. 164 -168). It
can be re-framed more directly here. Stated simply, we must weaken (if not abandon) the 
normative principle that differentially rewards educational attainment (grades, degrees,
and diplomas, etc.). In other words, if there were no longer any major pay off
economically and socially for educational attainment via the educational system per se,
then education through the educational system could be unwaveringly pursued for the
intrinsic and extrinsic value of pure educational benefits. Moreover, if educational
attainment in and of itself was less decisive for life chances, then the social and
economic compulsion to complete, for example, high school would disappear. Simply
consider what this would mean for the indifferent/hostile student as well as, remarkably,
for the drop out. By weakening (or even severing) the connection between the
distribution of surrogate educational benefits and the distribution of social and economic
benefits, the motivation to pursue educational attainment for purely defensive purposes
(to avoid the current plight of the drop out) is gone. The indifferent/hostile student
would be given a real choice concerning the future. And many of them would exercise
such a choice, at least for the time being, by dropping out of the educational system.
With the absence of unwilling and resentful students, we should expect plummeting
rates of school violence and the restoration of a healthy climate for learning.
But with a higher percentage of school leavers in the secondary school age population,
the social and economic costs of dropping out are greatly reduced. Dropping out is a
personal disaster and social stigma when only very few drop out. In a world of many
drop outs, employers cannot routinely screen for formal, but often suspect, surrogate
educational credentials.
There is an equal implication for the status and wealth seekers. If the pursuit of
educational credentials were no longer the primary route for "making it" in life, their
reasons for remaining in school and engaging in manipulative and deceptive behavior
patterns simply collapse. If "making it" is truly their goal, then they would be free to
expend their doubtless ingenuity outside the schools in other, hopefully more worthy,
pursuits in striving to reach it.
But with the educational system reduced, thusly, in size—retaining and, most
importantly, easily re-admitting only those who wish to profit from the disciplined
pursuit of knowledge, understanding, and callings—our society would be forced to
understand that the demands of real and lasting educational reform greatly exceed the
current, ephemeral attempts to tinker crudely and blindly with the educational system as
it exists. If we continue our present course, we may realize fleeting gains of a few points
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on test scores. (Note 21) Indeed, we may even be compelled to face the fact that there
might be a multitude of pathways to make the transition from youth to productive and
competent adulthood, only one of these through the educational system as such. (Note 
22) Quite apart from the now fashionable so-called "middle school philosophy"
developed to deal with disaffected students, we may need to think about returning to the
concept of the retired grammar school to provision all students with
elementary/intermediate literacy, civic, scientific, and mathematical knowledge and
skills, along with basic computer skills. Upon completion, students might then choose
between continuing in the academic educational system or opt out for more practical
educational opportunities. Except for the few advanced jobs and career categories—in
relation to the entire population—it is questionable that we need hordes of high-tech
people to run the economy. (Few of the status and wealth seekers and indifferent/hostile
students are currently destined for these positions anyhow. Indeed, more of them might
actually end up in these positions by easily re-admitting them into the educational
system when they are more ready.)
But the need to open new pathways (and in some cases re-open old ways) in the
transition to adulthood would raise a host of issues about how to structure strong
educational and economic policies to foster different kinds of practical learning 
experiences for youth directly in the workplace and other social settings. For it has never
been the case that the young have little interest in learning per se. Curiosity and the thirst
for learning are universally natural to the young. Rather, the problem is that we have
compelled young people to pursue one kind of learning -- scholastic/academic
learning—for ever increasing amounts of time without regard for its perceived relevance
to them. The clear and convincing result is now an educational system awash with status
and wealth seekers and indifferent/hostile students, not to mention their less rational
counterparts. By creating multiple pathways to adulthood that feature practical,
hands-on, experiential learning within a "real world" context, we can develop arenas that
will do much to foster moral attachment, real learning, and a "conscience of craft" (Note 
23) (for those currently disaffected with academic culture and practice). Rather than
stigmatizing such academic "drop outs," a multiple pathway approach might be far more
appealing to a majority of adolescents of all social classes (especially since it would not
foreclose the option of dropping back into the academic educational system later on).
(Note 24) It is true that many might not ever return to academics, as such. However, they
most likely would end up with far more marketable skills than our current crop of
disaffected high school graduates. With such skills, the nation's economic
competitiveness might be heightened beyond the educational reformers' dreams. (There
is more than a touch of irony in this.)
Such extra-systemic educational reform would not be easy by any means. (Note 25)
Indeed, it would require the creation of a public consciousness that education -- in all of
its forms and throughout a lifetime -- must be seen to be a society-wide responsibility,
not just the currently, and mainly age-segregated institution of schooling. The
educational system, if allowed, can easily succeed in the pursuit of true educational
excellence if its mission is appropriately construed as the producer, guardian and
transmitter of fundamental cultural and scientific understanding. It cannot, however, be
all things to all people as we now pressure it to be. For far from achieving continuing
competitiveness in the world -- so far an event that has as much to do with luck,
fair-enough economic design, strategic collapse in the old Soviet Union, and
immigration -- the current spate of educational reforms will do little to move us truly
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ahead on the road to educational excellence. And that is the ultimate lesson to be learned
from raising the question of the student in educational reform.
Notes
1 The inelegant, but descriptively accurate, term "studenting" was originally introduced
by Gary D Fenstermacher (1986) in "Philosophy of Research on Teaching. " It refers to
those activities of the student often necessary for student achievement.
2 We believe that the following sketch of an "ideal" student is widely held, but our
subsequent arguments do not rely on its being widespread.
3 This view paraphrases that of Paul H. Hirst in his justly famous essay, "Liberal
Education and the Nature of Knowledge" (1974). Howard Gardner's The Disciplined 
Mind (1999) gives a related formulation.
4 Hirst, Ibid.
5 Thomas F. Green (1999) in Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience
explicates the major difference between what he calls strong and weak normation. In
this instance, ideal students become strongly normed to the standards of excellence in
education (and to the academic purpose of schools in so far as schools support these 
standards). Indifferent students, as we shall see, are neither strongly normed to the
standards of excellence in education nor to schools, though they may be compliant with
school rules and routines (weak normation). Hostile students are neither strongly nor
weakly normed to the standards of educational excellence or the schools. Indeed, they
tend to be defiant of both.
6 Steinberg, et al. in Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed and What
Parents Need to Do (1996) studied 20,000 teenagers and their families in nine different
communities over a ten year period. From a psychologist's point of view, he examined
the "engagement" of young people in schools (with "engagement" defined as "the degree
to which students are psychologically "connected" to what is going on in their classes"
(p. 15).) In his sample, he discovered that around 40% of the teenagers from all social
classes were "disengaged" (p. 67). While there are strong reasons to prefer Green's (op.
cit.) notion of strong and weak normation in identifying types of students and their
motivations, Steinberg's "disengaged student" may serve as a proxy to our
indifferent/hostile types of students. We also take strong exception to Steinberg's
recommendations for "re-engaging" students. Steinberg's psychological framework also
fails to mark out how students who are disengaged might be acting quite rationally (from
their point of view) in the educational system. Accordingly, he omits any mention of a
connection among rationality, leading a good life, and avoiding harm.
7 See Ericson & Ellett (1990) "Taking Student Responsibility Seriously."
8 Ibid.
9 Postman (1995) in The End of Education strongly takes to task the current economic
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rationale for public education and calls for a new, far more noble, "metaphysics" of
education.
10 This section is strongly grounded in the work of Green et al. (1980 & 1997),
Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System, especially Ch. 6.
11 See Martin Trow's (1961) classic, "The Second Transformation of American
Secondary Education.".
12 This use of the term "surrogate" acknowledges that grades, for example, are neither
interval-ratio scales nor even ordinal scales. Their "sloppiness" as scales is what makes
them an efficient medium of exchange.
13 The United States, we should note, is far from a perfect educationally-based
meritocracy. Typical of capitalist economies, the U.S. legitimates social and economic
inequalities based on personal luck, perseverance, and even such things as a winning
personality. Increasingly, however, formal educational attainment governs entrance into
career and earnings networks and hierarchies.
14 The supporting arguments for regarding the normative principle as a principle that
legitimates subsequent inequalities in social and economic goods among persons is
given in detail in Green et al. (1980 & 1997), pp. 42–45. The point to grasp is that the
relation between (surrogate) educational benefits and non-educational social and
ecconomic benefits is not merely a strong, positive (causal) one, but also is a justified or
authorized one in our society.
15 The popularity of Scholastic Assessment Test coaching firms, such as the Princeton
Review and Kaplan, is a testament to this widespread attitude. They typically guarantee
higher SAT scores through emphasis on test taking skills and strategies, not the
acquisition of knowledge and understanding.
16 Again, see Steinberg (1996), op. cit., whose survey evidence comes closest to
providing this.
17 See, for example, Howard S. Becker (1989), "A School is a Lousy Place to Learn
Anything."
18 This phrase headlined The Nation at Risk report (Gardner, et al., 1983). The rhetoric
places education—and its support—on a par with national defense in terms of national
importance. As Green et al. (op. cit.,.,pp. 147 - 156 ) point out, this is the strongest
possible appeal for the support of the educational system.
19 Such standards of excellence internal to education are not to be confused with the
generally woeful, rarely even rationalized and certainly not justified, state educational
standards of the educational reform movement.
20 As opposed to the individualist"s identification of the good life with the satisfaction
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of private preferences, more communitarian-type views from Aristotle to MacIntyre and
Green locate the good life in the realization of irreducibly public goods embedded within
irreducibly social practices. For such views happiness is the zestful exercising of basic
human capacities (e.g., intelligence or inventiveness) in the pursuit or cultivation of the
kinds of excellences appropriate to a practice of a given kind. Though the excellences of
building a common world, building a family life, or of education require different kinds
of activities or performances, the performance "commanded," as it were, in each is a
kind of virtuosity. Thus, the goodness or badness of the performance is a matter of
objective evaluation in relation to the standards of excellence that are definitive of the
communally sustained practice.
This is not to reject the place and appropriateness of external goods such as wealth or
status in a full life. For these may result from a life devoted to the pursuit of excellence.
Rather, it is simply to note that external goods cannot be the aim of the good life on
communitarian grounds.
And again, we should stress, while individualism understands society as just
instrumental to the satisfaction of individual preferences, communitarians see society as
essential. For even while in competition to excel, communitarians understand that
internalization of the norms of the practice by all who compete is necessary to sustain its
flourishing existence. (This is why truth, courage, and honesty are central virtues to most
practices. Dishonesty and bad faith may often be the quickest route to fame and fortune,
but they undermine the deep layer of social solidarity that forms the foundation of any
practice.)
21 The recent Rand study (Grissmer et al., 2000) suggests that heavy-handed
accountability measures can squeeze out some gains, after all. But even here, the data
reporting of some states, such as Texas, is suspect. See, for example, Linda
Darling-Hammond (1999, p. 3).
22 The Coleman Report on youth in transition, though now long-forgotten, remains the
most serious and thought-provoking study in alternatives to the current regimen of
growing up in America. It needs to be re-visited. See James S. Coleman (1974).
23 See Green (1999), op. cit. Such settings, in other words, would be able to foster
strong normation and other attachments necessary for leading a good and productive life.
Weak normation (at best), anomie, and defiance are currently the phenomenological
states of the indifferent/hostile students in our schools.
24 In some ways our view is compatible with the views of Howard Gardner, "Getting
There," The Disciplined Mind, pp. 214– 240. We and Gardner both advocate the end of
the monolithic educational system. For even schools, as such, might have multiple
pathways as is common in Scandinavia, Germany, other parts of Europe, and Japan.
(Note that many of these societies are far more egalitarian than our own.) But Gardner
only sees the high technology pathway of Bill Gates, Louis Gerstner, and others.
Gardner fails to consider the possibility and viability of non-school pathways that would 
enable students to enter the career market in a variety of ways. But even if restricted to
schools, a multiple pathway approach would have distinct advantages. For the differing
"exit grades" of each would inhibit the continued existence of a common coinage
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(medium of exchange) as represented by the current formal domination of the Carnegie
Unit system and informal, but real, pressure exerted by colleges and universities to
specify the intermediate and high school curriculum in a manner to meet their own
needs.
25 For example, it may even require an examination and restructuring of the reward
schedules for certain learned professions such as medicine and law. Like the academic
profession (some of whose sub-specialties deserve similar attention), they already
command considerable social respect. But when coupled with relatively high economic
pay-off, their probability of attracting the strong attention of the status and wealth seeker
escalates enormously. The proliferation of "professional ethics" courses in professional
schools is a testament to the fact that the high professions are in imperiled in this way.
For the aim of status and wealth seekers is to profit them first and foremost, and only
incidentally serve their fellow human beings.
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